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Comments
Presumption of Legitimacy and the
"Action en Desaveu"
The purpose of this comment is to evaluate the existing
Louisiana law relating to the determination of legitimacy and,
illegitimacy of offspring and to reflect on the problems created
by the language of the Civil Code and the decisions of the courts
of this state. The first two parts of this comment, an analysis of
the pertinent articles of the Civil Code and of the problems presented by their texts, appear below. The third and fourth parts,
a review of the jurisprudence and a critical appraisal of the
Louisiana situation, will appear in a subsequent issue of this
REVIEW.

I. ANALYSIS OF CIVIL CODE ARTICLES 179, 184-192
The articles which are important in the first stage of this
inquiry' are:
Book I, Title VII, Chapter 1-Of Children In General:
"Art. 179. Legitimate children are those who are born
during the marriage."
Book I, Title VII, Chapter 2, Section 1-Of Legitimacy Resulting From Marriage:
"Art. 184. The law considers the husband of the mother
as the father of all children conceived during the marriage."
"Art. 185. The husband can not by alleging his natural
impotence, disown the child; he can not disown it even for
cause of adultery, unless its birth has been concealed from
him, in which case he will be permitted to prove that he is
not its father."
"Art. 186. The child capable of living, which is born
before the one hundred and eightieth day after the marriage
is not presumed to be the child of the husband; every child
1. The modifications which Articles 196, 197 and 960 of the Civil Code
may make on these articles will be considered in Part 2 of this comment.
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born alive more than six months after conception is presumed
to be capable of living."
"Art. 187. The same rule applies with respect to the
child born three hundred days after the dissolution of the
marriage, or after the sentence of separation from bed and
board.
"Art. 188. The legitimacy of the child born three hundred days after the separation from bed and board has been
decreed, may be contested, unless it be proved that there
had been cohabitation between the, husband and wife since
such decree, because it is always presumed that the parties
have obeyed the sentence of separation.
"But in case of voluntary separation, cohabitation is
always presumed, unless the contrary be proved."
"Art. 189. The presumption of paternity as an incident
to the marriage is also at an end, when the remoteness of
the husband from the wife has been such that cohabitation
has been physically impossible."
"Art. 190. The husband can not contest the legitimacy of
the child born previous to the one hundred and eightieth day
of marriage, in the following cases:
"1. If he was acquainted with the circumstances of his
wife being pregnant previously to the marriage.
"2. If he was present at the registering of the birth or
baptism of the child and signed the same, or if not knowing
how to sign, he put his ordinary mark to it, in the presence
of two witnesses."
"Art. 191. In all the cases above enumerated, where the
presumption of paternity ceases, the father, if he intends to
dispute the legitimacy of the child, must do it within one
month, if he be in the place where the child is born, or
within two months after his return, if he be absent at that
time, or within two months after the discovery of the fraud,
if the birth of the child was concealed from him, or he shall
be barred from making any objection to the legitimacy of
such child."
"Art. 192. If the husband die without having made such
objection, but before the expiration of the time directed by
law, two months shall be granted to his heirs to contest the
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legitimacy of the child, to be counted from the time when
the said child has taken possession of the estate of the husband, or when the heirs shall have been disturbed by the
child, in their possession thereof."
It may be observed at the outset that it would be unreasonable to construe Article 179 literally to mean that all children
born during marriage (and none born after its dissolution) are
legitimate. This would be contrary to the natural expectations
of people who would at least want their posthumous children
to be considered legitimate. And such a strict interpretation
would be inconsistent with Articles 184-192, under which, as
will be shown, children born less than three hundred days after
dissolution of marriage usually are to be considered legitimate
and children born during marriage sometimes are subject to
disavowal by the husband of the mother or his heirs. The
meaning of Article 179, therefore, must be that legitimate children are those born of the marriage, that is to say, those born
of a married woman and her husband. It may be noted that the
French text of Article 198 of the Civil Code of 1825, of which
Article 179 is a translation, reads in terms of the children nds
dans le marriage, which probably is translated better as "born
of the marriage" than as "born during marriage." If "during"
had been intended, the draftsmen probably would have used
"pendant" instead of "dans." "Dans" literally means "in" but in
this article of the Civil Code it probably was used in much the
same sense in which the Anglo-American law uses "born in
wedlock."
Turning now to an analysis of the plan of Articles 184-192,
it can be shown that the matter of legitimacy is approached in
terms of the paternity of a child either conceived by or born of
a woman while married. For the first case, that of a child conceived during a marriage, Article 184 establishes the basic presumption that the husband of the mother is the father of the
child conceived by her. The date of conception is thus important,
and yet because it is so difficult to ascertain, Articles 186 and 187
establish presumptions and non-presumptions of conception during marriage. Actually the articles are worded in terms of presumptions of paternity in the husband, but the criteria are the
dates of marriage, birth, separation from bed and board, and
dissolution of marriage. Yet the child conceived during marriage
is not necessarily conceived by the husband of the mother; hence,
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Articles 185, 187 and 189 name the few specific situations in which
the presumption of paternity in the husband ceases, though the
child is admittedly conceived during the marriage. The second
case, that of a child born during marriage though presumably
conceived before the marriage, is dealt with in Articles 186 and
190. These articles, like those discussed above, prescribe rules
in terms of presumptions and non-presumptions of paternity in
the husband. Finally, Articles 191 and 192 give the husband of
the mother, or in the case of his death, his heirs, the right to
bring an action to disavow the child whenever the presumption
of paternity ceases and give them certain delays in which to
exercise this right. This action is known to civilians as the action
en desaveu.
From the above analysis three important conclusions follow:
(1) Articles 184-192 have no application unless the child is
born or conceived of a married woman.
(2)

When a child is born or conceived of a married woman,
only the husband or his heirs may bring the action of
1
disavowal.

(3)

If they do not bring the action within the time allowed,
they will not be permitted to do so at all, and the child
will be considered that of the husband of the mother.

The plan of the articles having been explained, their provisions may be examined to determine exactly in what instances
they do or do not presume the husband to be the father.
The Child Born Less Than 180 Days After Marriage
Article 186 provides that a child born "capable of living" and
before the 180th day after marriage is not presumed to be the
child of the husband. Thus, it would seem that the child which
is born prior to the 180th day and which is capable of living must
be disavowed if the husband of the mother does not wish to be
regarded as the father; but it would seem that the husband would
not be required to disavow the child which is born during that
time but which is not capable of living. Thus the determination
of "capable of living" would seem extremely important. The
article, however, does not help in this regard. It defines a child
born capable of living as one born alive more than six months
after conception. Obviously, this definition is unsatisfactory, for
it requires a determination of the time of conception while the
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main purpose of the article in its entirety is to raise a presumption to avoid the necessity of making such a determination in
fact. The definition being useless, it would seem that the husband must act to disavow any child which is born alive prior to
the 180th day after the marriage if he wishes to avoid being considered its father.
There are two instances, however, in which the husband
may not disavow the child born less than 180 days after marriage,
both provided by Article 190. The first is that a husband may
not contest the legitimacy of such a child if he knew of the
pregnancy of his wife at the time of marriage; the second is that
he may not do so if he was present at the registry of the birth of
the child and signed the same. The rationale of such a rule is
probably that, even conceding the child was not conceived in
wedlock, it should enjoy legitimate status if the husband by his
acts has impliedly admitted that he is the father. Such a rule is
very similar to that of Article 198, in the section "Of Legitimation," under which the subsequent marriage of the' parents of a
child born out of marriage legitimates the child if the parents
have admitted it to be their own.
The Child Born 300 or More Days After
Separationfrom Bed and Board
Article 187, by referring to Article 186, says that the nonpresumption of paternity in the husband of the mother "applies
with respect to the child born 300 days ... after the sentence of
separation from bed and board"; but the husband's right to bring
the action in this case is denied him by Article 188 if it is shown
that he has cohabited with his wife since the judgment of separation. That article explains why the presumption of paternity
ceases when a child is born 300 or more days after judicial separation; it is "because it is always presumed that the parties have
obeyed the sentence of separation." While possibly desirable for
the sake of explanation, the clause is not necessary to the article.
Nor was it necessary to provide in the last sentence that cohabitation is always presumed in the case of voluntry separation.
The Child Born 300 or More Days After
Dissolution of Marriage
Article 187 also provides that "the same rule applies with
respect to the child born 300 or more days after dissolution of
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the marriage." Must the husband institute an action en desaveu
under those circumstances? It would be highly illogical to
require a former husband to institute the action if a child be
born five years after divorce-or even worse, to require the
heirs of the husband to disavow a child born five years after his
death. Nevertheless, the articles on this subject in the French
Civil Code are substantially the same as ours, and there is French
doctrine and jurisprudence to the effect that a former husband
under those circumstances must institute an action to disavow
the child or it will be presumed conclusively to be his.2 In the
opinion of the writer, however, the reasoning of the French is
not compelling. As shown before, Articles 184-192 deal only with
the child who is born or conceived of a married woman. This
being so, there is no need to extend the rule requiring the husband of the mother to disavow the child whenever the presumption of paternity ceases to those cases in which the child is neither
born nor conceived while the mother is a married woman. This
rule, established by Article 191, certainly must be considered
limited by the context in which it appears.
Circumstances Other Than Date of Birth or of Conception
Which Destroy the Presumption of Paternity
Article 185 excludes impotence of the husband as a ground
for disavowal of his wife's child. It also provides that the mere
proof. of adultery on the part of the wife will not be a cause for
such action, but provides further that adultery together with
concealment of the birth of the child may be grounds. The
reasoning behind such a provision must be that a mother has no
reason to conceal the birth of a child from her husband if he is
the father. Such a concealment is in the nature of an admission
of her wrong and such an admission entitles the husband to
institute an action to disavow the child. The article makes no
requirement that the time of adultery correspond with the period
of conception of the child, although it quite obviously should be
interpreted that way. It must be noted that the express denial
of the action of disavowal because of impotence of the husband
or adultery of the wife not accompanied by a showing of concealment of the birth of the child is merely out of an abundance
of caution, for certainly these provisions add nothing to the
general scheme of Articles 184-192.
2. 2 Planiol et Ripert, Trait6 Pratique de Droit Civil Frangais § 733 (2 ed.
1952); Bailly, 47 Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Civil 372 (1949).
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Article 189 states another factor which destroys the presumption that the husband is the father of the child, namely,
"when the remoteness of the husband from the wife has been
such that cohabitation has been physically impossible." The rule
of the article is understandable only if it is taken to mean that
cohabitation has been impossible at the time of the conception
of the child.
Delays for Bringing the Action en Desaveu
Article 191 requires that the husband bring the action within
one month after the birth of the child "if he be in the place
where the child is born" or within two months after returning
"if he be absent at that time." He is given two months "after the
discovery of the fraud, if the birth of the child was concealed
from him." Under Article 192 the heirs of the husband may institute the action if the husband dies without having brought the
action during the period within which he is permitted so to do.
They are allowed two months to bring the action "to be counted
from the time when the said child has taken possession of the
estate of the husband, or when the heirs shall have been disturbed by the child, in their possesion thereof."
Having examined the plan of Articles 184-192 and discussed
their content in detail, it is now possible to restate them in such
a manner as better to expound their approach to the subject
without altering their substance in any way.
Article A. The husband of the mother is considered the
father of a child born during the marriage or
within 299 days after its dissolution unless he or
his heirs have cause to disavow such child and
do so successfully.
Article B. There is cause for disavowal if the child is born
before the 180th day after marriage, unless the
husband knew of the pregnant condition of his
wife at the time of marriage or was present at
the registration of the birth or baptism of the
child and signed (or, not knowing how to sign,
placed his mark on) the registry in the presence
of two witnesses.
Article C. There is cause for disavowal if the child is born
300 or more days after a judgment of separation
from bed and board unless it is proved that the
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husband and wife cohabited after such judgment.
Article D. There is cause for disavowal if the wife has committed adultery and concealed the birth of the
child from her husband.
Article E. There is cause for disavowal if the remoteness of
the husband from his wife has been such that
their cohabitation has been physically impossible.
Article F. Where there is cause for disavowal, the father
must institute the action of disavowal within one
month after the birth of the child if he was present when the child was born, or within two
months after his return, if he was absent at the
the time, or within two months after discovery
of the fraud if the child's birth was concealed
from him.
Article G. If the husband die without having instituted an
action of disavowal, but before the expiration of
the time within which he is permitted so to do,
his heirs shall be granted two months to institute the action, which two months are to be
counted from the time when the child either
takes possession of the estate of the husband or
disturbs the heirs in their possession of it.
II.

LACUNAE AND PROBLEMS

Even after careful analysis the articles leave the reader with
important problems unsolved.
Presumption of Paternity in Two Persons
In the case of a child born during a second marriage and less
than 300 days after the dissolution of a prior marriage, if Articles
184-192 were to be applied literally, there would sometimes be
a presumption of paternity in both the former and present husbands. The child born 180 days or more after the second marriage would not be subject to disavowal by either. Ordinarily,
the child born less than 180 days after the second marriage could
be disavowed by the second husband; but where he fails to bring
a timely action, or is precluded from bringing it by the provisions
of Article 190, then again there would be a double presumption
of paternity. It may be that Articl 960, which is found under the
title "Of Successions" and in the chapter on the "Incapacity and
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Unworthiness of Heirs" may be determinative of some of these
situations; it reads as follows:
"If the mother marry again within two months after
the death of her husband, and a child is born five months
after the second marriage, if the child be born capable of
living, it is considered the issue of the first marriage, and is
admitted to the succession of the first husband." 3
As the above article is found in the title "Of Successions,"
it may be asked whether it applies to determine paternity and
legitimacy as well as to determine succession rights. The mere
fact that the article contains the words that the child "is considered the issue of the first marriage" is not of itself determinative
in the light of the context in which the language appears. If
Article 960 is not determinative of paternity and legitimacy, then
the problem here raised remains. If, however, the article is determinative of paternity and legitimacy as well, then it will be
necessary to determine whether it applies to cases of dissolution
of the first marriage by divorce as well as by death of the husband. Since the article is worded in terms of "the death" of the
first husband and is in the title on successions, it could be applied
in the case of divorce only (1) by analogy, or (2) by regarding
Article 960 as being in pari materia with Articles 184-192, or
(3) by considering Article 960 as being a specification of the
"natural law and reason" to which the judge may resort on
authority of Article 21 when there is no law covering the situa-,
tion. In any event, the fact that divorce was not part of our
law when the article was first inserted into the Civil Code 4would
be argument to extend its application to that case today.
Assuming that the article applies to paternity and legitimacy, there would remain other problems of interpretation.
These may be considered in terms of specific fact situations in
each of which it must be assumed that the second marriage
has taken place within two months after the dissolution of the
first.
In the case of a child born five months or less after the second marriage and less than 300 days after dissolution of the first,
Article 960 makes it plain that the child is considered the issue
3. There is no article in the French Civil Code corresponding to Article
960 and consequently there is no French,doctrine or jurisprudence to aid in
its interpretation.
4. Article 960 first appeared in the Civil Code of 1825. Divorce was first
authorized in Louisiana by La. Acts of 1827, p. 130.
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of the first husband. If it is within the scope of the article to
determine paternity, it would seem that the second husband is
relieved from the necessity of disavowing such a child.
In the case of a child born more than five months after the
second marriage and less than 300 days after dissolution of the
first, Article 960 may well be interpreted as implying that the
child is to be deemed the child of the second husband and not
that of the first. If this period of more than five months after
the second marriage is in fact less than 180 days, then the result
might be that the husband is precluded from the possibility of
bringing the action to disavow-even though apparently he is
specifically permitted to bring such an action by Article 186. This
would be a very harsh rule, for probably the child would be that
of the first husband.
Another possible interpretation of Article 960 would be that
the redactors of the code intended to give a solution for the situation in which there is a presumption of paternity in two persons
because the second husband fails to bring an action of disavowal
by relieving the second husband of the necessity of so doing in
the case of a child born five months or less after the second
marriage. It should be recalled that the article has no application to the case of a child born after that period even though
less than 180 days after the second marriage, and that in any
event the second marriage must have taken place within two
months of the dissolution of the first.
Possible Limitation on Applicability of Articles 184-192
The question may be raised whether Articles 184-192 are to
be applied in all cases in which the child is born to or conceived
by a married woman. To make the question clear, it need only
be asked whether the articles should be applied to the child of
a married woman living in open concubinage with a man other
than her husband and rearing the child as that of her paramour.
If so, then in spite of the general practical knowledge to the contrary, the child legally will be considered the child of the husband and not of the paramour if the husband fails to or cannot
successfully disavow it. It may be noted that the French, whose
Civil Code articles on the subject are substantially the same as
ours, hold the view that the rules of Articles 184-192 are applicable only to the child who is in possession of the apparent
status or reputation of legitimacy, and not to the child who does
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not have the apparent status or reputation of being the child of
the husband of the mother. The basis for this view is found in
Articles 323 and 325 of the French Civil Code, which for practical purposes are identical with Articles 196 and 197 of the
Louisiana Civil Code. These articles read as follows:
"Art. 196. If there be neither register of birth or baptism,
nor this general reputation, or if the child has been registered under a false name, or as born of unknown parents,
also if the child has been exposed or abandoned, or if his
condition has been suppressed, the proof of his legitimate
filiation may be made either by written or oral evidence."
"Art. 197. Proof against the legitimate filiation may be
made by evidence that the plaintiff is not the child of the
mother whom he pretends to be his, and the maternity being
proved, that he is not the child of the husband of the
mother."
It will be noted that Article 197 might indicate that in some
instances a person may be allowed to prove that another is not
the child of the husband of the mother. This would seem to be
in conflict with Articles 184-192. The French, however, find no
conflict. They point out that Articles 196 and 197 are in the section of the code entitled "Of the Manner of Proving Legitimate
Filiation" and that all the articles in this section relate to the
situation in which a person is forced to prove he is the legitimate
child of certain parents. From this the French argue and conclude that Articles 184-192, under the preceding section of the
code, deal only with the child who possesses the apparent status
or reputation of legitimacy and who therefore will be regarded
as legitimate if the husband of the mother does not disavow him.5
Thus the French contend that any time a child is not in enjoyment of the appearance or reputation of legitimate status and
must prove his legitimate filiation, persons interested in proving
otherwise may do so even if it is necessary to show that the husband of the mother is not the father. Under this view there can
be no doubt that the husband of a woman living in concubinage
would not have to disavow her children, for since there would
be no reputation of apparent status of legitimacy, Articles 184-192
would not be applicable.0
5. 1 Ripert, Trait6 El6mentaire de Droit Civil de Marcel Planiol, no 1396
(1948).
6. The jurisprudence has reached the contrary result. See, for example,
Elol v. Mader, 1 Rob. 581, 38 Am. Dec. 192 (1841) and Succession of Saloy,
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Another possible interpretation of the article, however, is
that after the child who seeks to establish legitimate filiation has
proved his maternity, his opponents might prove "that he is not
the child of the husband of the mother" in the sense that the
mother was not married to the alleged father at the time of his
birth or conception. Under such an interpretation, there would
be no conflict with Articles 184-192.
Commencement of Delay Periods
A different type of problem is presented by Article 191, which
allows the husband one month within which to bring the action
en desaveu if he is "in the place" where the child is born and
two months if he is absent. The meaning of "in the place" in
itself presents difficulties; but, in addition, it may be asked
whether the delay runs as long as the husband is "in the place
where the child is born" even though he does not know of the
birth. A possible answer is that the redactors of the code intended
that the delay begin running at the time of birth only if the
husband knew of such birth. This argument is strengthened by
noting that the article in dealing with the case where the birth
has been concealed from the husband specifically provides that
the delay does not begin to run until "after the discovery of the
fraud." There is no valid reason for saying that knowledge of
the birth is less important in situations other than concealment.
The provision permitting a two month delay from the day of
the return of the husband if he was absent at the time of the
birth might logically be said to presuppose that absence means
ignorance of the birth because it would be inconsistent with the
spirit of the article to permit a long delay to a husband who
knew of the birth but who was some distance away from his wife.
The wording of Article 192 gives rise to another problem. It
provides that if the husband die within the period in which he is
permitted to bring an action to disavow his wife's child, the heirs
are given two months to institute the action "to be counted from
the time when the said child has taken possession of the estate
of the husband, or when the heirs shall have been disturbed by
the child, in their possession thereof." Thus the article would
seem to require that the heirs wait until the child has taken
possession of the estate or has disturbed them in their possession
before instituting the action. But what would be the position of
44 La. Ann. 433, 10 So. 872 (1892).
Parts 3 and 4 of this comment.

This jurisprudence will be discussed in
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an heir who has inherited property from the deceased husband,
which property would belong to the child if legitimate? Would
there be no way for that heir to determine ownership? Would a
declaratory judgment on the legitimate status of such child be
permitted when an action to determine that status is not? The
language of the Louisiana Declaratory Judgments Act 7 is quite
broad, but the writer does not express any opinion on the possibility of its being so used. A prospective purchaser who is well
informed would not be satisfied to rely on the public records in
purchasing from such an heir.8 If the heir sells, the vendee is
clearly not subrogated to the heir's right to institute the action
en desaveu in the event that the heir disturbs the purchaser in
his possession. Possibly the vendee could call the heir in warranty in such a situation and the heir could then institute the
action, assuming that it is done within the two month delay. But
the fact remains that a careful buyer would not purchase under
such doubtful conditions. Here is a notable conflict of policies.
It is certainly undesirable to refuse a party the right to determine the ownership of property, but it is contrary to the spirit of
Articles 191 and 192 to allow a long indefinite period of time to
the heirs to institute the action en desaveu.
The analysis of the texts of the Civil Code made in Parts I
and II of this comment above show that their interpretation is
not free from difficulty. It now remains to consider the Louisiana
jurisprudence on the subject and to make an appraisal of the
whole. This will be the subject of Parts III and IV of this comment, which will appear in a subsequent issue of this REVIEW.
Harold J. Brouillette
7. La. R.S. 1950, 13:4231-4246.
8. See Long v. Chalain, 187 La. 507, 175 So. 42 (1937), which stands for
the general proposition that the public records doctrine does not defeat the
rights of forced heirs.

